recommend the military cease holding the press at arm's length. Instead, the military should embrace the press and leverage the media's technology and worldwide reach to further strategic goals.
SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S DECISION
During the build up to the war in Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld faced an important decision regarding the military's public affairs policy. He needed to decide the way in which the war would be covered by radio, television, and print media (hereafter referred to as the media). The Defense Secretary had three courses of action. He could continue the practice of limiting the media's access to the battlefield and simply conduct press briefings at the Pentagon and the military's operational headquarters as done during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Secretary Rumsfeld could employ a second option that envisioned a return to the management of the media through the creation and use of media pools as had been done during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, now known as Gulf War I. A third course of action suggested that the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military leverage the media using an extremely radical public affairs plan now referred to as the Embedded Media
Program.
In consultation with his Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Victoria Clarke, Secretary Rumsfeld chose to implement the Embedded Media Program because he understood that the media coverage of the coming war would "shape public perception of the National Security Environment." The technology used by the media to report instantaneously from distant locations, along with the rise of non-American news agencies (specifically the Arab news agency, al Jazeera) would overpower military public relations efforts. The American and international media had to have freedom of access and reporting, free of the restrictive nature of press pools and without unnecessary censorship. Secretary Rumsfeld announced his decision in his Public Affairs Guidance message dated 10 February 2003, "We need to tell the factual story --good or bad --before others seed the media with disinformation..." While the concept of embedded reporters during war was not new, the number of reporters envisioned under the Embedded Media Program was much more robust than ever attempted in any previous conflict. Unfathomable to many strategic leaders was the fact that many of the reporters would be able to go 'live' from anywhere in the battlespace with news of battles, complete with audio and television images of death and destruction. Remembering the impact of edited and delayed film reports during the Vietnam War, several military leaders had difficulty trusting the media enough to allow unlimited access. The by-product would be brutal images of war and death -instantly televised to every American living room.
Much of the senior/career level leadership (officer and enlisted) of today's military remains scarred by Vietnam and its aftermath. A whole generation of military leaders believe the US lost the war in Vietnam because the media turned public opinion against the soldier in the field. This belief in a media betrayal shaped the military's view of the media and the ethics of reporters during the past two decades. Many Americans (both military and civilian) agree with the worries expressed by General Colin Powell during the planning for the first Gulf War. In 1990 he felt that instantaneous battlefield reporting via television would bring home the horrors of war, along with graphic scenes of combat and death. Reporters and cameras recording every step in a prolonged offensive ground war would create disillusionment and anti-war sentiment at home. These fears led to the policy of press pools.
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To make the Embedded Media Program work, Secretary Rumsfeld had to first demonstrate that the press pools of the first Gulf War were not the optimum way to use the media in a war. While the military liked the coverage of Gulf War I and the American public was ecstatic with General Norman Schwarzkopf's briefings and aerial bomb footage, the media left the war saying "never again." Walter Cronkite, writing in February 1991, decried the military's control of the media coverage through the press pools and the monitoring of stories and interviews with the soldiers in the field. In his opinion, the military was attempting to hide something. Cronkite believed that if the ground war had lasted longer than a few weeks, this sense of hiding something would have led to a breakdown of popular support for the war.
THE POWER OF INFORMATION
In 1991 Saddam Hussein controlled the media in Baghdad, using it as a propaganda tool to show the death and destruction caused by the coalition bombing. Secretary Rumsfeld understood that if the American-led coalition failed to leverage the media in the coming war, the enemy might win the information battle by using the media to their advantage.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Bryan Whitman remarked that the control of information was a major objective of the American-led coalition in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The military needed to "take the offensive to achieve information dominance and to counter Iraqi lies." Under Secretary Rumsfeld's guidance, the military planners came to understand that the "robust coverage" envisioned in the Embedded Media Program could build and ensure domestic/international support for the war. continued to announce that the coalition forces were nowhere near Baghdad, embedded reporters simultaneously reported the crossing of bridges leading into the city, the taking of the international airport, and the seizure of key points throughout the city. 6 The noted writer and commentator, Joseph Nye, referred to the military's ability to leverage the media as the he waged a strong propaganda campaign using the Arab news agencies. His attempts to sway public support through televised images of US prisoners of war and Iraqi civilian casualties, along with reports of coalition atrocities, were successfully countered by embedded media reports. These reports provided believable accounts of the "professionalism, heroism, and restraint" of coalition forces. The world listened, watched, and believed these reporters more than they believed Arab news reports. 15 If the embedded reporters had not been present, the propaganda war would have had a much different outcome. The embedded reporters brought more than their ability to report the war first hand through the eyes and voices of soldiers. They also commented knowledgeably on the ability of the US forces to improvise and adjust when the tactical situation forced a modification to combat plans. The embeds had access to the original plans and were aware of the commander's intent.
TRUE IMAGE OF WAR
They also understood that no plan survives the first shot. In OIF, instead of criticizing the tactical situation as plans changed, the embeds knew the whole story and reported to the 2003) , 226-227. The Battle for Tikrit (described on page 251) affords another example of leveraging the media for intelligence value. Brigadier General John Kelly commanded Task Force Tripoli whose mission was to capture Saddam's hometown following the fall of Baghdad. As his task force approached the town, BGen Kelly called up the reporters embedded with his unit along with some local Iraqi tribal leaders. He told them to spread the word that the Marines were here, and that anyone threatening the life or property of another individual (Iraqi or American) would be dealt with -with deadly force. The word was dispersed via the news and word of mouth that afternoon and evening. By the next morning the Kurds who had planned to attack the town had withdrawn and the town quickly surrendered to the Marines. Commanders at all levels must be aware that their words and actions will be reported and leveraged by all participants.
LOSING THE INFORMATION WAR
For all its successful efforts in leveraging the media to achieve information operations The scope of this paper does not lend itself to suggesting a complete modification of the 22 Cook.
23 Reporters on the Ground conference.
24 Ibid.
rules. I believe they could be combined and/or reduced. One of the rules that should be changed concerns the embedding of local media (i.e., from the military unit's hometown). The PAG allowed a regional/local reporter to embed and cover the preparation and deployment of a unit from home station to its arrival in the war zone. After arrival in theater, the reporter was required to apply to the OASD(PA), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), to be assigned as a combat embedded reporter. Unfortunately, the regional/local reporter had very little chance of being assigned to the hometown unit he had followed from the United
States. 25 Accommodations should be made to allow one regional/local reporter to embed with a hometown unit from preparation through redeployment. If the rule is modified, the decision on which regional/local reporter should be allowed to embed must remain with OASD(PA).
Commanders should not be placed in the position of choosing among reporters when they are preparing to deploy or engage in combat.
REPORTING AND RESPONDING TO CASUALTIES
The rules prohibited the embedded reporters from reporting the names of casualties and required that they refrain from filming casualties. However, the rules allowed the embeds to report when a unit was in contact or had fought a battle. They could report there had been casualties, and even detail the exact number of dead and wounded if they knew for certain from first hand knowledge. 26 While this seems an appropriate approach to combat reporting, the real time reporting of casualties in a unit caused a number of families at home to worry and wait for the feared visit from a military casualty assistance call officer.
I understand the embedded reporters were simply doing their job. As long as they did not identify the casualties or breach operational security, the military could not censor their efforts. On the other hand the military must acknowledge the speed of real time reporting and video images of battle and improve its casualty notification process. There is no way to get ahead of the news of battle or the reporting of casualties in a particular unit. But the military's laborious notification process for death or injury did not work in OIF and will not suffice in the next war. It is a given that the families of those in combat will be sitting at home hanging on every word concerning their loved one's unit. They will laugh and cry at the good news stories and wait in fear when reports of combat and casualties mention their units. 
RESPONDING TO THE CRITICS
In the forward to CBS News' chronicle of the war in Iraq, Dan Rather defends the embedded reporters and the Embedded Media Program. Rather, who was a war correspondent in Vietnam, admits that wartime journalism cannot be expected to provide the full story of all that is happening on the battlefield. In war there is no time for reflection on how the events unfolding before the camera lens fit into world events. In most cases the reporter will be unable to provide a general context for the images. Wartime journalists can only provide "a first draft of history," incomplete and possibly wrong or misleading. The brigade commander's decision and actions appeared to be working until he received word that his brigade headquarters (at the airport) had been hit by missile fire. Simultaneously, Colonel Perkins learned his supply line was in danger of being cut off and overrun.
Without a command post to serve as the brigade's command and control nerve center and a supply line to refuel and rearm the force, the brigade could possibly become trapped in the city and overrun. As Mr. Zucchino writes, "Perkins knew the prudent move was to pull That duty fell to Defense Department personnel in the Pentagon. The fact that the Pentagon failed to provide that strategic context and instead let the analysts in studios fill in the strategic 'holes' needs to be rectified for all future conflicts. both the military and the American people. The military and the media overcame many barriers of distrust and antagonism. The task before us is to build upon the successes enjoyed in OIF and attempt to correct or minimize the problem areas. While the Pentagon might claim that each future conflict will have to be examined before determining a public affairs policy, the truth is that the 'fork in the road' has been taken and there is no turning back. The Embedded Media
Program is here to stay. ******* 
